Former Migori Governor Okoth Obado at Milimani High Court for his judgment over the alleged murder of his former lover Sharon Otieno. [Nancy Gitonga, Standard]
When the High Court delivered its judgment in Republic v. Zacharia Okoth Obado & 2 Others, convicting former Migori Governor Okoth Obado, his personal assistant Michael Oyamo, and county clerical officer Caspal Ojwang Obiero for the 2018 murder of Sharon Otieno, public sentiment welcomed the judicial closure. For many, the ruling represented a decisive blow against impunity and political privilege.
Yet, beneath the headlines and moral outrage lies a judicial record that raises serious legal questions. As the case transitions from the trial court to the appellate corridors, legal scholars and observers must ask: Did the trial court establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or did it construct a conviction on logical leaps and inferred guilt?
The phantom perpetrators and the circumstantial chain
The prosecution’s case against the three accused rested entirely on circumstantial evidence. No eyewitness placed Obado, Oyamo, or Obiero at the immediate scene of the fatal assault, and no direct forensic evidence tied them to the murder weapon. The court concluded that Sharon was brutally killed in a forested area in Homa Bay by "unidentified men" who boarded motor vehicle KCL 481K.
Under established legal principles, most notably Sawe v. Republic, circumstantial evidence can only support a conviction if the inculpatory facts form a chain so complete that it excludes every other reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of the accused.
Here, the actual executioners—the unidentified men—remain faceless phantoms who were never arrested, charged, or identified. The prosecution did not produce direct evidence or forensic communications proving that these unidentified assailants were acting on the direct orders or payroll of the appellants. Can three men be deemed principal co-conspirators to murder when the physical line of command between them and the actual killers was inferred rather than proven?
The constitutional friction: Silence vs special knowledge